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J. Hagan (1988) STRUCTURAL CRIMINOLOGY, Oxford: Polity Press.
294 pages. $45.00.
S. Wheeler, K Mann, andA. Sarat (1988) SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE
SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS, London: Yale U.P..

199 pages. $45.00.
These books contain works of very different kinds. Structural
Criminology treats white-collar sentencing as part of a more general
account of the role of power relations in influencing delinquent behavior and social reaction to different crimes; Sitting inJudgment-the
latest contribution to the excellent Yale series on the control of
white-collar crime-is an interview-based study of the way in which
fifty-one U.S. Federal judges who deal with a substantial number of
white-collar cases approach the sentencing of offenders. Whereas
Hagan is concerned centrally with operationalising and testing views
about the importance of class and power to crime causation and
criminal sentencing, Wheeler, Mann and Sarat can scarcely summon
up a mention of the word 'class', either in their interviews or in their
commentary. Whereas Hagan provides an explicit critique of the
view that criminology should be mainly about policy analysis, and
makes no comment on the policy implications of his work, Sitting in
Judgment concludes with a lucid critique of the crudity of sentencing
guidelines compared with the sophistication shown by the judges
interviewed, and makes some practical recommendations for future
developments in sentencing policy. Hagan's work contains much
quantitative analysis, whereas Wheeler et al. merely footnote (p. 5)
the fact that their own statistical analysis' is consistent with what
judges say about what they do. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate
that they be reviewed together, as representing two approaches to
the sentencing of white-collar crime, both with weaknesses as well as
strengths. I shall deal with each separately.
Those who were brought up to take for granted that ideology,
Wheeler, Weisburd, & Bode, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender: Rhetoric and Reality,
47 AM. Soc. REv. 641 (1982).
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sophisticated statistics, and verstehen-type illumination at the level of
meaning are mutually exclusive will be greatly disturbed by Hagan's
important book in which he draws together previously published
journal articles by himself and his collaborators and supplements
them with some new work and with introductory and concluding
chapters. The book's central theme is the development of a sociological approach to criminological theory which links crime and delinquency to power relations. Hagan sets out his criminological stall
with the following assertions (p. 1):
structural relations organized along vertical, hierarchical lines of
power are of greatest interest to criminologists. Perhaps this is because crime itself implies a power relationship. To perpetrate a crime
is often to impose one's power on others, while to be punished for a
crime is to be subjected to the power of others. Of course, these
power relations are subject to change... What distinguishes a structural criminology is its attention to instrumental and symbolic uses of
power, both in relation to criminal behavior and in the study of reactions to this behavior.
He goes on to criticize dominant criminological paradigms-labelling, conflict and control theory-which (p. 2) "often imply that
crime is a product of power relations, but our methodologies conventionally ignore this premise." He claims that none of these approaches measure "class or status group memberships in the kinds of
relational terms that determine the location of individuals in positions of power" (p. 2). Hagan seeks to put these precepts into practice ostensively with penetrating studies of the relationship between
class and criminality, criminal sentencing, and the family in
delinquency.
Hagan's introduction (p. 3) complains that the Sutherland definition of white-collar crime "not only shifts attention away from corporations as the units of study, it grounds the measurement of class
position in gradational notions of 'respect' and 'status'." By contrast, he seeks to reinstate the centrality of structural measures of
class position, grounded in relations of ownership and authority, for
(p. 4) "owners of businesses and persons with occupational authority are located in positions of power that allow use of organizational
(usually corporate) resources to commit larger crimes than persons
located in employee positions without authority." Hagan is doubtless correct in arguing (p. 9) that
employers are becoming quite adept in using the power that derives
from their structural location in the social organization of work to distance and disengage themselves from the crimes that they nonetheless
encourage subordinates to commit... The effect is to leave the latter
more open to the application of criminal sentences.
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However, despite the conceptual merits of his approach, it is not selfevident that status-based and class-based analyses will lead to very
different results. Certainly, his later chapter on white-collar crime
and punishment demonstrates that employers do better than managers, but would the former not score higher than managers in status terms also? Ironically, and unmentioned in the text, it is with
regard to questions such as how people in apparently lowly positions
obtain relative immunity from prosecution that the power-relational
approach yields starker benefits compared with a status-based approach. As the work of Mars 2 -not to mention Sergeant Bilko
films!-on workplace theft and deviance indicate, modest-ranking
manual and clerical workers may exert considerable control over
production and service delivery, and may be allowed to get away
with substantial continuing frauds. It is therefore arguable that
structural criminology depends upon micro-sociological observational work for adequate descriptions of power relations.
The essay on white-collar crime and punishment acknowledges
that Sutherland's approach did not rely on 'crimes' being violations
of actual criminal codes but rather on "legal description of acts as
socially injurious and legal provision of a penalty for these acts."
Hagan, like others, 3 uses samples convicted under criminal statues
(including securities laws) as the unit of analysis. However, in Britain, as in North America, many are dealt with by other disposal
methods, including closure of their firms by regulatory authorities,
civil disgorgement of profits (e.g. for insider trading), suspension of
some firm members, and administrative tribunal fines, censures, and
reprimands. These are not incorporated into the analysis found
here, although Hagan did interview some securities regulators to
broaden his perspective.
Hagan observes (p. 26) that the decision to charge under either
the Canadian Criminal Code or the (noncriminal but imprisonable)
Ontario Securities Act is important, since although there are no statutorily imposed minimum sentences and 57% of those convicted
under the criminal Code receive less than the one year maximum
under the Securities Act, those convicted under the latter tend to
receive lighter sentences. The data suggest that managers are
treated with disproportionate severity and employers with disproportionate leniency. Following Watergate, there was increased
2

G.

MARS, CHEATS AT WORK

(1982).

3 See Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode, supra note 2; Benson & Walker, Sentencing the

White-Collar Offender, 53 AM. Soc.

REV.

294 (1988).
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prosecution of employers as part of what Katz4 called the social
movement against white-collar crime, but greater leniency in the use
of Securities Act charges against them. 5 Curiously, it was only after
Watergate that employers were significantly less likely than workers
to be charged under the Criminal Code. On the other hand, both
before and after Watergate, managers were significantly more likely
than workers to be charged with Criminal Code offenses. The increased prosecution of managers and employers after Watergate
was offset by a reduced use of criminal (as opposed to Securities
Act) charges. Hagan concludes (p. 35) that in the post-Watergate
period,
employers were particularly unlikely to be charged under the Criminal
Code. Indeed, occupants of this class position were in this period the
least likely in the sample to be charged as criminal offenders. Meanwhile, members of the managerial class continued to be the persons
most vulnerable to these charges.
But why was this the case? Was it due to prosecutor bias, to their
perceptions of judical reaction-why bring a case to trial if the
judges might dismiss it? Does the possibility that employers commit
fewer offenses because they feel rich enough and do not want to
prejudice their legal earnings by risking imprisonment and/or disqualification from trading account for the disparity? The incidence
of fraud in different sectors and different power levels is not discussed, but in his analysis of differential sentencing, Hagan focuses
upon (1) an increased tendency of employers not to want to know
how their subordinates achieve profit targets, so long as they
achieve them, thereby not incurring liability for themselves but not
discouraging what one might term 'aggressive entrepreneurship' in
managers; (2) the relative ease of proving a specific securities
charge compared to a more emotive criminal charge in a complex
case, complexity being positively related to offender class; (3) the
positive relationship between class and internationalization, which
makes employer cases more expensive and thus less likely to be
prosecuted as crimes; and (4) the possibility (p. 39) that there may
be some violation of the relative autonomy of law in ensuring that
employers were not charged with criminal code but rather with securities code violations (i.e. there was some sort of political or empathetic 'fix').
Although these factors are very plausible, there are a number of
problems with the analysis. First-familiar to many investment
4 J. Katz, "The Social Movement against White-Collar Crime," in E. Bittner & S.
Messenger (eds.), Criminology Review Yearbbok, vol. 2 (1980).
5 It is not clear whether or not there was any substitution of charges.
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frauds and even to bankruptcy frauds 6 -is that it may be difficult to
ascertain whether a business is wholly illegitimate or is legitimateturned-into-fraud. This might make a difference in categorizing
perpetrators as employers or workers. (The operationalization of
class measures is discussed more fully on pp. 124-128, although the
petty bourgeoisie is omitted therefrom on the dubious grounds that
Marxists typically argue that it is on the wane.) It appears that those
Canadian 'professional criminals' involved in major international
frauds (and who operate large 'boiler room' operations with many
employees to sell price-manipulated securities which later prove valueless) might end up classified here as workers: a class identity that
they might well resist! It is easier to criticize than to suggest an
alternative, but 'organized crime' connected securities racketeers
might deserve separate categorization.
Second, the analysis does not incorporate the length of prison
sentences. This omission is a problem because some American
studies-reviewed by Levi 7 and by Benson and Walker 8-find that
although up-market white-collar criminals are less likely to be incarcerated, once judges decide to jail them, they generally receive
tough sentences.
Third, no allowance seems to have been made for the time
lapse between offense commission and official processing which, in
Britain, may take some years, or even be infinite. 'Staleness'-even
when engineered by suspects' maneuvers-reduces the risk of being
investigated and prosecuted, and, where witness recall is important,
the risk of conviction. Moreover, in the English case in which Member of Parliament Keith Best was convicted in 1988 of attempting to
obtain a pecuniary advantage by deception by filling in multiple applications for a new stock issue using variations of his name and different addresses, an explicit rationale for the Court of Appeal
overturning the trial judge's sentence of imprisonment was that at
the time when the offense was committed, it was not unambiguously very
culpable, even thoughfuture 'staggers' were to be put on notice that
their acts would risk imprisonment. So, because matters prosecuted
soon after Watergate would have been unlikely to have been influenced in their modus operandi by those events, from a retributivist, as
opposed to denunciatory/general deterrent standpoint, it is not irrational for post-Watergate judges to take a short-term stand
6

M.

LEVI, THE PHANTOM CAPITALISTS: THE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF LONG-

FIRM FRAUD (1981).
7 M. LEVI, REGULATING FRAUD: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS

(1987).
8 Benson & Walker, supra note 4.
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against more severe punishment. Whether this actually explains
their sentencing is a different issue.
Not all of Hagan's findings travel well across the Atlantic. His
discussion of the importance of prosecutors as well as probation officers in influencing sentence (one may note this also in the Boesky/Levine insider trading cases that were too late for his book or
for Sititng in Judgment), is less applicable for the U.K., since except
for the selection of charges with different maxima, prosecutors have
no formal-and apparently little informal-role in recommending
9
sentence in white-collar crime cases.
Finally, although it may have been the case that Ontarian prosecutors were more reluctant to expose the unacceptable face of the
leading figures of capitalism after Watergate, there is no evidence of
this, and it is more plausible that some employers committed fewer
violations while others were more careful in how they committed
them (i.e. there is some general deterrent effect, even if only towards
professionalization of crime). In this respect, time has overtaken the
findings slightly, at least as regards insider trading prosecutions of
senior dealers in the United States. This brings me to the point that
measures of class are more problematic than Hagan indicates. The
post-Fordist era-in the sense of the decline of mass production
heavy industry-has witnessed a renaissance of small (in number of
employees) enterprises that may do multi-million dollar business.
This is as true of financial services as it is of other service and even
production areas. This creates problems for traditional and Marxian analyses of class structure beyond those appreciated by Hagan in
his later chapter on race, class, and the perception of criminal injustice. Arbitrageur and insider trader Ivan Boesky was definitely an
owner, but did not have many subordinates, preferring to work ad
hoc: the fewer people who know about what one is doing, the less
the risk of leaks. (Surely Boesky is not apetit bourgeois, though he was
apparently in the outer circles of the social elite.) Drexel Burnham
Lambert executive Dennis Levine had many subordinates and had
some equity in the business, as do most senior managers, but was
not a director. Does this make him an employer, or a manager?
How should he have replied to the Hagan question of "Do you now
own a business?" (p. 125). (What would Meyer Lansky have replied
to this?) In the present climate of worker/manager/director shareownership, the operationalization of class is capable of conflicting
interpretation. Some readers might wish to know more about how
9 This position is unlikely to be affected significantly by the introduction of Crown
appeals against sentence in § 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
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such classifying decisions were made by Hagan and his associates.
The fact that his work stimulates such thoughts is testimony to the
value of Hagan's attempts to go beyond the more modest levels of
analysis employed by others, including myself, while eschewing the
rarified atmosphere of Grand Theory. The remainder of the bookwhich includes a discussion of the relative advantage obtained by
corporate victims compared with individual ones-is important to
criminologists, but it is inappropriate to discuss it in a review of
white-collar sentencing.
Sitting in Judgment is an altogether different work. Judges' perspectives on sentencing are wholly absent from Hagan's study; indeed, he might regard their views about how and why they sentence
as epiphenomena substantially irrelevant to the factors that bestpredict their behavior.10 Although Wheeler, Mann, and Sarat do at
times critically interrogate judges about the way they claim to sentence, their book is primarily an ex postfacto phenomenological and
inductive account of how judges operate. It is not (and is not intended to be) a critical examination of whether they ought to operate thus or whether they are internally consistent in their use of
moral categories. However, this appreciative methodology provides
a welcome insight into the judicial mind.' Indeed, it exemplifies the
vast gulf that exists between the British and American judiciaries
that such an account of the sentencing process could have been carried out at all with the full co-operation of judges."I
At least prior to the development of sentencing guidelines in
the 1980s, U.S. sentencers were subject to minimal control over discretion. Subject to the maxima (where appropriate), and the
number of indictments, sentences were unfettered by sentencing
case law. A previous volume' 2 showed brilliantly how both defense
and prosecution sought to manipulate the information presented to
a court, whether for conviciton or for sentence purposes. Yet the
impact of these attempts at manipulation did not seem to be consistent. Some judges stated that guilty pleas benefited the defendant
because trials led to judgments of enhanced harm and culpability;
others said that trials led to greater leniency, since the offender became a human subject rather than the object of a Pre-Sentence In10 See generally C. FITZMAURICE & K. PEASE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OFJUDICIAL SENTENCING
(1986).
11 M. LEVI, supra note 7. Quite apart from the unco-operativeness of English judges,
an equivalent British study of white-collar sentencing would be impossible also because
subject to future convictions following the establishment of the Serious Fraud Office in
1987, there have been no sophisticated elite fraudsters convicted there.
12 K. MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (1985).
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formation Report. These are interesting variations, but the way in
which they are treated in the text reveals some of the weaknesses of
the verstehen method of sympathetic understanding as practiced
here. Would different judges have reacted in these opposite ways to
the same case, or were variations simply the product of different examples that would have generated consensus among the judges on
each case? We do not know, nor is the question raised by the author/interviewers except in a vague and unsatisfactory way at the
end of the book.
A number of studies reveal that judges prefer 'real-offense sentencing' irrespective of what counts are charged in the indictment,
and that they are less inconsistent in doing so than might be expected. Thus, one judge states (p. 32) that "[I]'m not concerned
about the deal the defendant made to hide the full extent of the
deficit," and another (p. 34) that "[Y]ou could make twenty counts
out of the one victim, so it's the number of victims and the amount
that ultimately controls the sentencing." Nevertheless, some judges
feel more constrained than others to apply due process during the
sentencing stage. As one judge put it, when stating why he decided
to restrict himself to sentencing solely on one indictment in a guilty
plea (p. 31), "[I] wasn't going to let the government try, without a
jury, nine-tenths of the case. If they wanted to go to trial, they could
have gone to trial." Here too, what is intriguing is the variety of
possible responses, making judge-spotting (and venue-dodging?)
important to case strategists.
Judges are said to apply to their contemplation of the appropriate sentence three principles which together form a sort of 'common
law of sentencing': harm, blameworthiness, and consequences
(both for 'society' and for those sentenced). The authors state (p.
24) that
in their search for principles of sentencing judges reach back.., to the
cultural norms from which both legislation and case law are drawn.
Underlying their commonsense judgments is a broad normative base
formed in part, to be sure, by legal conceptions, but also by more general concepts that are embedded in the culture.
Of course, it may be that what the authors mean by 'culture' is 'legal
culture,' and indeed, almost all of their historical prologues to harm
and culpability deal with the way in which legal codes developed the
terms. From the viewpoint of understanding the context in which
judges are socialized, legal doctrine probably is important (although
the analysis neglects their social background and any influences arising therefrom). Yet this 'history from above' is surely too unproblematical a reading of what judges do, implying as it does that
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there is a high level of consensus 'in the culture': that judges may
believe there is broad consensus does not mean that there actually
is. Crime seriousness surveys may indicate a fair degree of consensus on the most serious and the least serious crimes, but there is
much dissensus in between, and attitudes toward crime do not
translate directly into attitudes toward punishment.1 3 Furthermore,
the sorts of questions asked in most seriousness surveys oversimplify the blaming process in organizational crime, thus understating
the kind of dissensus that might appear in the interpretation of culpability in actual cases. Perhaps judical views about how to sentence
white-collar offenders, like the 'common law' itself, may take too
much for granted that their own views are shared by the great majority in society.
To be fair, the authors do go on to discuss the way in which the
concepts of harm, blameworthiness, and consequences are operationalized in different cases; themes which are summarized and
placed in context more in the final chaper. Interviews with judges
about the harmfulness of white-collar crimes reveal that by contrast
with armed robbery and the ubiquitously evil drugs, they see them
as relatively harmless because they are nonviolent. The authors
state (p. 64) that no judge referred to the physical damage risk created by toxic waste or dangerous cars, possibly because none of
those came to mind as white-collar cases. There seemed to be a
consensus that amounts of $2,000 or less would not require a severe
sanction, while six-figure losses are "serious and likely to require
incarceration." (p. 67) What does not appear to feature-and is unmentioned in the book-is assessing damage in relation to the
means of those who lose, except in the context of tax crimes, whose
seriousness is reduced because there "is a general feeling that it is
alright to steal from the government because the government has
got unlimited amounts of money and nobody is particularly hurt by
it." (p. 74) Thus, as in the concept of materiality in auditing, a hundred dollar loss to an uninsured poor person may mean more than a
million dollar loss to a bank with fidelity insurance.' 4 Judges do take
the nature of the victim into account, but they do not appear to
translate dollar losses into income or wealth ratios.
Although the authors express concern about the rationality of
this view, offense duration was also important in assessing harm, "as
13 M. LEVI, supra note 7; M. Hough & N. Walker (eds.), Public Attitudes to Sentencing
(1988); P. Rossi, J. Simpson, &J. Miller, "Beyond Crime Seriousness: Fitting Punishment to the Crime," 1 J. QUANT. CRIM. 59 (1985).
14 M. Levi, "Fraudulent Justice?: Sentencing the Business Criminal," in P. Carlen
and D. Cook (eds.), Payingfor Crime (in press).
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a proxy for the repetitive and patterned nature of the offense on the
one hand, the deliberate, calculating nature of the offender on the
other." (p. 70) The visibility of actual harm and the personal nature
of the victim was important in assessing offense seriousness, though
this was sometimes mitigated if the victim was seen to be complicit.
(The latter is particularly germane when the prosecutor gives immunity in exchange for testimony against a usually higher status person
in the dock.) One question that might have occurred to the authors
(but apparently did not, for it is not mentioned even in the concluding overview) is whether the judges apply the same reasoning to
sentence non-violent bank burglars as lightly as white-collar
criminals.
The final important aspect of offense seriousness is trust violation, which enhances considerably its gravity because it is seen as
having an impact far beyond its victims. It does appear there that
there is a principle of noblesse oblige that judges apply to the people in
the highest positions in the private and public sectors, though also
to any criminal justice official and to some more junior public officials who take bribes. (This is interesting in relation to'the discussion of the significance of social class by Hagan, although class often
also reflects status.)
When it comes to offender culpability, the absence of prior convictions is crucial, because except in the gravest cases or where there
are signs of long unconvicted offending, judges think that people
deserve a chance to reform, but prior convictions are a sign of incorrigibility. Judges believe that they treat first-time white-collar offenders more severely than other first offenders, particularly where
they believe that the offender has been deliberate and scheming.
The sentencing of different offenders in the same case is decided on
perceived culpability grounds, but one judge observed (p. 101) that
in offenses like price-fixing, apportioning culpability is particularly
difficult. A good war record is a major mitigation, as is having modest rather than high intelligence-for not being clever tends to reduce culpability! Similarly, service to the community is considered
in mitigation. Also important is motivation: whether the crimes are
seen to be committed out of greed or situational temptation in
which more banal financial pressures drive the offender. Often, the
fact that the offender has now taken a low-paid job like truck driver
will show that he is 'basically honest' except, of course, where it is
seen by the judge as a devious ploy to excite his or her sympathy!
The interviews with judges (pp. 132-122)
revealed virtually no concern with individual rehabilitation of the offender. Instead these judges showed that their concern for punish-
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ment is often based on ideas about the general social control themes
of utilitarianism of the eighteenth century. Harm and blameworthiness are considered by these judges as prerequisites to the meting out
of punishment, as moral-legal restrictions on the use of the criminal
sanction. Subsequently, judges' primary focus is on the need to attain
a general deterrent effect. Here harm and blameworthiness may be
relevant, not as moral prerequisites to the use of criminal sanctions,
but as measures of the strength of the need to deter other potential
offenders... In addition, and despite their neglect of rehabilitation,
the judges do consider the immediate effect of their sentence on the
offender and those caught up in the offender's life. These considerations often constrain the judges from giving full reign to the deterrence rationale.
The authors assert (p. 136) that the media were an important source
of pressure to incarcerate, though no evidence for that can be discerned from the interviews. Judges believed (correctly) that publicity was very important as a means to general deterrence, and
sometimes went to the lengths of suggesting strongly to postal inspectors and the banking association that they disseminate information about sentences imposed on postmen and bank tellers
respectively. It is scarcely conceivable that English judges would do
this. Their beliefs in the deterrent impact of imprisonment were
confirmed also by feedback from people such as the district director
of the Internal Revenue, who told them about increased tax returns
from doctors following jail sentences on doctors for tax fraud. (Presumably, they never receive counter-evidence, even where some exists, although this possibility goes unmentioned by the judges or the
authors. Thus, the tendency would be for judges to receive only
positive reinforcement for their sentences.) On the other hand, the
prospect of professional disbarment and social shame for offenders
acts as a brake on the need to imprison, as does old age and ill
health. None of these factors is common in non-white collar cases.
The length of sentence may be mitigated also by the perceived
strain of awaiting trial. One judge stated that the length of time tax
cases took to come to trial was why he sentenced tax fraudsters to a
shorter period than he did bank tellers, whoese pre-trial wait tended
to be much briefer.
The authors emphasize the relative abnormality of white-collar
cases compared with the routinized plea-bargain justice that exists
in the state courts and even in Federal courts for common 'crimes.'
They state (p. 8):
Even with their greater resources and professionalism, federal judges
deal in quantity with common crime defendants in drug cases, robbery
cases, interstate movements of stolen vehicles, and the theft or forgery
of government checks. In these areas, something akin to going rates
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found in state courts may operate. But the white-collar cases that occur with some frequency in federal courts are a homogenous lot that
make simple construction of the central features of a case difficult.
Rather than categorizing the case as an instance of a general type routinely handled by the court, judges often feel they must examine
closely the characteristics of offense and offender in order to understand the nature of the case before them.
Granted that this generalization is accurate, it raises to the critical
reader the questions: (1) why is it that white-collar cases are treated
as if they are heterogeneous, while other cases can be routinized,
and (2) is this justifiable? The binary classification of cases as heterogeneous/homogeneous is by no means as self-evident as the authors' use of these terms implies. Why, for example, do judges
spend so much time probing behind the surface of white-collar indictments to discern "the essence of the case" (p. 35) but (by implication) comparatively
little time
trying to discern
the
motivational/factual background of common crime indictments?
Although the authors later (pp. 160-163) discuss the greater empathy ofjudges for the white-collar offender and his or her family, and
judges' beliefs that blue-collar offenders are not embedded in family
and community relationships, this is a good illustration of the sort of
important issue left unexamined by this book.
Federal judges emerge from this study as thoughtful, sophisticated, relatively humane people whose mental processes are far
from the caricature presented in most radical critiques of bias and
social injustice in sentencing. The socialization of the judiciary is
left implicit and is never examined in depth, but judges are portrayed-in a footnote on p. 167-as sharing a common sociolegal
culture and training which "may tend to offset any differences in
background, temperament, and style that judges bring to their
work." Yet at times, occupational background factors do seem to
emerge as significant, even if we never learn enough about social
class or personal biography to question the general downplaying of
their salience. For example, the need for prison sentences to deter
was sometimes reinforced by some judges' experience as defense
counsel, where their clients had taken a relaxed attitude to indictment or had even gained prestige in their country clubs by claims
that they had been unfairly persecuted (p. 151). Unfortunately,
however, there is no way of knowing from this study whether experience as a white-collar defense counsel was commonly associated
with more severe sentencing (rather than, as the conspiracy and cultural homogeneity theorists might predict, with less severe
sentencing).
In a sophisticated overview in the final chapter, the authors con-
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clude that to "a considerable degree, sentencing is both rational and
principled beneath its appearance of lawlessness" (p. 167), and that
the sources of disparity lie not in lack of sentencing principle but in
variations in the way these are transformed into actual sentences.
Thus, after observing (p. 170) that sentencing of white-collar cases
is harsher in Texas than in the Southern District of New York, 15 the
authors state that "while judges evaluate the relative seriousness of
cases similarly they may have different cutting points for determining which offenders go to prison and which do not." Yet this might
lead some of us to question the practical value and meaningfulness-other than for ideological or self-justificatory purposes-of a
principle or set of principles that leads to such unpredictable and
inconsistent results. 16 But whether in order to get judges to take
the book seriously or as a result of the authors' own intellectual/moral colonization (by subjects of their research personally or
by legal ideology), it is noticeable that conflict theory, let alone
Marxism, does not appear between these consensual cultural sheets,
even as a footnote in history. I am not one who believes that one
can separate opinions or actions from class position. I have criticized elsewhere 17 the view that class interests in the control of
white-collar crime are readily determinable, not least because many
victims of major fraud are (or were!) rich and powerful. But it is intriguing that in the whole book, there is not a single reference to the
socio-economic background of Federal judges, to critical criminology, to critical legal studies, or to criminological evidence about
public attitudes toward white-collar crime and its sentencing. As
such, this may indicate what a good job the authors have made of
capturing the spirit of the legal culture, which similarly ignores
these intellectual and empirical currents. It is nevertheless frustrating to see such an intellectually decontextualized account, particularly when applied to white-collar crime sentencing.' 8
Apart from brief references to appellate review in Britain and
Scandinavia, the world outside North America appears not to exist.
It is consistent with the approach of the authors and with their view
that sentencing guidelines ought to adapt to judges' present sentencing perspectives that the sole non-jurisprudential English work
15 Such disparities may be considerably reduced by the sentencing guidelines.
16 See Levi, Suite Justice: Sentencingfor Fraud, CRIM. L. REv. (June, 1979).
17 M. LEVI, supra note 7.
18 See Benson & Walker, supra note 4, for a deeper and more grounded sociological
attempt to explain variations in white-collar sentencing in different areas of the United
States.
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to which they refer is David Thomas' Principlesof Sentencing 19 rather
than Andrew Ashworth's more conceptually critical Sentencing and
Penal Policy. 20 Judges can always find some rationale which fits
whatever sentence they wish to impose. 2 ' The fact that they are
able-self-consciously or not-to do this does not make each sentence ipso facto justifiable. These gaps, combined with its contentment with an inductive method that never seeks to transcend its
otherwise praiseworthy depiction of the judicial mental frame, make
Sitting in Judgment unsatisfactory for reliance on as the sole standard
text on sentencing white-collar crime, even for Americans. It is nevertheless extremely valuable as a monograph.
Despite my criticisms and the caveats in the text about the risks
that ex postfacto interviews may not reveal the real processes ofjudicial thought, what we are left with is a fascinating insight into how
judges approach the task of sentencing white-collar crime. Even if
they have not met some of my ideal objectives, the authors should
be congratulated for achieving their own, and for providing a stimulating, well-written text for others to interpret as they see fit. Both
these books demonstrate the enormous subtlety and sophistication
of white-collar crime sentencing studies since the earlier critiques of
criminal injustice whose central explanatory motif was a relatively
crude class bias. 22 Wheeler, Mann, and Sarat's approach gives a
more detailed insight into the way judges construe the impact of
status and personal circumstance, while Hagan's data enable us to
test whether what judges believe corresponds to what they do. Yet
there remains a nagging problem. What both studies do is to focus
on financially oriented white-collar crime-principally securities
fraud-and to ignore corporate crime (such as health and safety offenses), thereby omitting the sentencing of what the average member of the public regards as very serious areas of corporate
23
malefaction.
It is important to bear in mind that even though the work reviewed here has given a sophisticated understanding of legal and
social reaction to white-collar fraud, our analysis may not apply to
19 D. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING (1978).
20 A. ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND PENAL POLICY (1983).
21 L. WILKINS, CONSUMERIST CRIMINOLOGY (1984); Fitzmaurice and Pease,

supra note

11.
22 R. REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON

(1979, 1984).

23 M. LEVI, supra note 8; M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, P. TRACY, & S. SINGER, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY (1985). CULLEN, MATHERS, CLARK, & CULLEN, Public
Supportfor Punishing White-Collar Crime: Blaming the Victim Revisited, 11 J. CRIM.JUSTICE 481

(1983); Grabosky, Braithwaite, & Wilson, The Myth of Community Tolerance Towards WhiteCollar Crime, 20 AusTL. AND N. Z.J. CRIM. 33 (1987).
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other major moral and intellectual issues in business criminality.
The harms caused by pollution and by health and safety violations
are seldom intentionally produced in the sense of being desired for
their own sake, although they may be a foreseeable result of corporate policies. Moreover, neither greed nor capitalism are necessary
or even sufficient explanations of where and when they occur. However, 'regulatory offenses' such as pollution and health and safety
violations have their financial roots as well. A more rounded and
critical account of criminal sentencing should seek to incorporate
these issues and to account for why crimes for gain are treated so
differently.
MICHAEL LEVI*
READER IN CRIMINOLOGY
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF WALES COLLEGE OF CARDIFF
WALES

SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS IN DOING

EVIL by Jack Katz New York, Basic Books, 1988. viii + 367
pages. $19.95.
I.

THE COMPELLING PROJECT AS AN EXPLANATION OF THE
FOREGROUND CAUSATION OF CRIME

Jack Katz's Seductions of Crime' challenges the way "positivist"
criminology is carried on. Positivist criminology focuses on finding
background forces, "defects and deficiencies in psychological biographies or social environments," notwithstanding the fact that, even
given the best background correlations to criminal behavior (age,
gender, intelligence), many of those who fit the positivist categories
do not commit crimes, many of those who do commit crimes do not
fit the categories, and, what Katz sees as most damning, many of
those who are correctly predicted to engage in criminal activity do
not commit crimes for long periods of time when background factors remain present. 2 In other words, Katz levels two criticisms of
* Reader in Criminology, School of Social and Administrative Studies, University of
Wales College of Cardiff. Ph.D., Southampton University, 1979; M.A., Oxford University, 1976; Dip. Crim., Cambridge University, 1972; B.A., Oxford University, 1971.
1 j.
(1988).
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2 Id. at 3-4.
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positivist criminology. First, even the best background correlatives
to criminal behavior are under- and over-inclusive. Of course, this
is to be expected, given the goal of such criminology: to identify
cause-and-effect relations between social and psychological factors
and criminal activity at the margins of aggregate behavior. Even the
most positivistic of the positivist criminologist acknowledges the validity of this charge, and it is not the real focus of Katz's inquiry.
The second challenge is central to Seductions of Crime. Background
factors which predict marginal changes in criminal activity cannot
predict whether particular individuals will engage in crime. Katz is
concerned with identifying a method of description that will.
Katz's explanatory method centers around the notion of the
"compelling project." First, and obviously enough given his explanatory goal, "something causally essential happens in the very
moments in which a crime is committed." 3 This assumption is built
into his theory by the very question he asks. And it is essential that
this causal factor be, in the usual sense of the term, a cause-in-fact.
Both the existence and the precise causal mechanisms of this cause
might be obscure and uncertain, but Katz's explanation must clearly
identify a real causal relationship between it and the criminal behavior which follows it. If the cause-in-fact relationship is not established, then Katz has at best a correlative factor which explains
crime, if at all, at the margins of aggregated behavior. Without this
causal relationship, his work cannot answer the question he poses.
Next, "the assailant must sense, then and there, a distinctive constraint or seductive appeal that he did not sense a little while before
in a substantially similar place .

crime."'4

.

. he must suddenly become pro-

pelled to commit the
If the cause-in-fact of crime in particular instances is viewed as a noumenal act of free will, then it is
impossible to speak of particular, foreground "causes" of crime at
all: only willful choices. To ask the question he asks forces Katz to
think in terms of external forces which induce (compel or entice)
individuals to act. Note that this does not commit Katz to a view
that crime is caused by external factors over which the criminal has
no control (he does not hold such a view), nor does it commit Katz
to deterministic or behavioristic psychology. It only commits him to
a discourse of external determinism to answer the question he
poses. Since thick descriptions of individual choices can be described in deterministic terms just as easily as in terms of free choice
3 Id. at 4.
4 Id.
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(i.e., determinism and free will are artifacts of discourse),5 Katz's
question only compels him to identify external forces which cause
(via inducement or compulsion) criminal behavior; he is not committed to any particular view of free will and determinism which informs our blaming practices.
By asking a question which is strange from the perspective of
contemporary criminology-'What causes non-marginal criminal
behavior in the experiential foreground?'-Katz is led to set up a
strange looking explanatory paradigm-'Locate sensual causes-infact which compel or seduce crime.' The picture of human beings as
determined in their routine lives by external, compulsive forces, is
an intuitively implausible one. But, in fact, it is rare in our daily lives
that we do experience our behavior as freely determined. Katz follows the sociologists of symbolic interaction 6 in emphasizing that it
is in our routine lives that we most experience ourselves as compelled or seduced by outside forces-we are fascinated, repelled, excited, bored, moved, etc., by things and others-and that only in
exceptional situations we see "that it was not the things in themselves but our perspective which temporarily lent to things outside
or us the power to seduce or repel."' 7 It is important to repeat the
warning which concluded the last paragraph. Although Katz must
employ an explanatory discourse of external cause-and-effect to explain the features of crime which puzzle him, he is not committed to
a view which locates blame or responsibility outside of the actor. In
fact, it is clearly the actor him- or herself who "conjures up" and
manages the sensual forces which compel the crime. But only a discourse which talks about the external seductive or compulsive posture of such forces provides an answer to the question Katz poses.
As Katz explains it,
The challenge for explanation is to specify the steps of the dialectic
process through which a person empowers the world to seduce him to
criminality. On the one hand, we must explain how the individual
himself conjures up the spirit. On the other hand, we must accept the
attraction or compulsion as authentic.... For a person to experience
being influenced or determined, he must lose a reflective awareness of
the abiding, constructive workings of his subjectivity.... To complete
successfully the transition from subject to object and achieve the emo5 See M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 86-113 (1987); Kelman, Interpretive Construction in Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981).
6 See, e.g., H. GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 35-75 (1967); Blumer, Society as Symbolic Interaction, in HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL PROCESSES 179 (Rose ed.
1962); Cicourel, Basic and Normative Rules in the Negotiation of Status and Role, in RECENT
SOCIOLOGY No. 2 4 (Dreitzel ed. 1970); Emerson, Behavior in Private Places: Sustaining
Definitions of Reality in Gynecological Examinations, in Id. at 74.
7 J. KATz, supra note 1, at 5.
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tional extremes of eros or thanatos, a person may have to arrange the
environment to "pacify" his subjectivity.... As unattractive morally
as crime may be, we must appreciate that there is genuine experiential
creativity in it as well. 8
Katz proposes a threefold description of this "dialectic process": on the one hand, there is the "emotional process" of the experience of the external seductions and compulsions themselves; on
the other hand, there is a practical "path of action" which must be
traversed in order to respond to the seductions and compulsions (a
set of practical exigencies to be overcome in performing the criminal act). In between the two is a "line of interpretation" of self and
others; "unique ways of understanding how one is and will be seen
by others" which bridges the gap between the invocation of seductive and compulsive forces and the practical exigencies of the criminal act. In other words, the actor stands as the intermediate agent
between compulsive and seductive forces and the physical actions
(including practical exigencies) which constitute crime. 9 Part of
Katz's explanation is to elucidate these forces and exigencies. But
such an explanation is not yet an answer to Katz's question. (In fact,
an explanation of the forces and exigencies, linking them without
anything more, is a form of the positivistic criminology that I mentioned above.) In order to be an answer, Katz must link the two with
an agent who "employs" the forces (while responding to them) to
make him- or herself capable of meeting the practical exigencies of
the crime.
Thus far my presentation of Katz's ,method should be uncontroversial (unless, of course, you think his motivations for raising
the question of practicularistic foreground cause are specious). The
compelling project as an explanatory paradigm follows quite closely
from the question he asks. Seductions of Crime is not written to address either the basis of Katz's question ° or the relationship of his
notion of the compelling project to it. The book argues that the
emotional processes of the various crimes discussed (and by implication, perhaps, all crime) are of a particular kind:
Central to all these experiences in deviance a member of the family of moral emotions: humiliation, righteousness, arrogance, ridicule,
cynicism, defilement, and vengeance. In each, the attraction that
proves to be most fundamentally compelling is that of overcoming a
8 Id. at 7-8 (emphasis in original).

9 Id. at 9.
10 Except in the sense that the proof of posing the question lies in its answer, which,

Katz argues (and I think correctly), should help expand the field of criminology and
reconstitute its conclusions. I discuss the implications he claims, and their validity,

below.

356

BOOK REVIEWS

[Vol. 80

personal challenge to moral-not to material-existence. For the impassioned killer, the challenge is to escape a situation that has come to
seem otherwise inexorably humiliating. Unable to sense how he or she
can move with self-respect from the current situation, now, to any
mundane-time relationship that might be reengaged, then, the wouldbe killer leaps at the possibility of embodying, through the practice of
"righteous" slaughter, some eternal, universal form of the Good.
For many adolescents, shoplifting and vandalism offer the attractions of a thrilling melodrama about the self as seen from within and
from without. Quite apart from what is taken, they may regard "getting away with it" as a thrilling demonstration of personal competence, especially if it is accomplished under the eyes of adults.
Specifically "bad" forms of criminality are essentially addressed to
a moral challenge experienced in a spatial metaphor. Whether by intimidating others' efforts to take him into their worlds ("Who you
lookin' at?") or by treating artificial geographic boundaries as sacred
and defending local "turf" with relentless "heart," "badasses" and
barrio warriors celebrate an indifference to modem society's expectations that a person should demonstrate a sensibility to reshape himself
as he moves from here to there....
Overall, my objective is to demonstrate that a theory of moral self
transcendence can make comprehensible the minutia of experiential
details in the phenomenal foreground, as well as explain the general
conditions that are most commonly found in the social backgrounds of
these forms of criminality. II
It is with Katz's identification of moral transcendence-the taking and holding of an essentially moral position 1 2 and refusing to be
driven from it-that this review is most concerned.
II.

MORAL TRANSCENDENCE AS THE CAUSE OF CRIME

Katz argues that the appeals of moral transcendence as the sensual compulsive or seductive cause of criminal behavior are of two
kinds. First, this transcendence can come in the form of resisting
conventional canons of moral respectability. "Being bad" shakes off
the confining conventions of expected conduct. Second, it comes in
the form of resisting social expectations of moral malleability. "Being hard" resists the conventions of easiness which mark social
life-the accommodations and sufferances, small and large, which
maintain social peace-and presents the self totally committed to a
line of moral action. Notice that being bad does not inherently connote externally projected badness-in fact, Katz's account of adolescent shoplifting hinges on the project of managing the distinction
between inner (and stealthy) badness and outer respectability11 Id. at 9-10.
12 By "moral" I do not mean morally praiseworthy, but characteristic of a normative
value worked out in a modus vivendi.
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while being hard does. To be hard is to refuse to engage in the
social actions which both require and sustain malleability. In the
project of being hard, the sensual attraction-transcendence
through hardness-has a built in practical requirement-projection
and sustenance of hardness over against a world which demands
13
malleability at every turn.

Katz's descriptions of heat-of-passion homicide and adolescent
shoplifting turn on versions of the transcendent project which exemplify, respectively, hardness and badness. It is worth looking at
his account of them before examining the combination of the forms
of transcendence which marks predatory street crime.
A.

BEING HARD: HEAT-OF-PASSION HOMICIDE

Katz defines passionate homicide as "an impassioned attempt
to take a sacrifice in order to embody one or another version of the
'Good.' "14 His description of it contains three elements:
One feature of the typical homicide, then, is its character as a selfrighteous act undertaken within the form of defending communal values ....

These homicides are not morally self-conscious acts on the

order of calculated political assassinations or coldly executed acts of
vengeance. They emerge quickly, are fiercely impassioned, and are
conducted with indifference to the legal consequence. Thus, the second feature of this form of homicide is that the attacks are conducted
within the spirit of a quickly developing rage.... What the nonpredatory assailant is attempting to do is more accurately captured by the
concept of sacrifice: the marking of a victim in ways that will reconsecrate the assailant as Good. 15
The killer must experience a precipitating movement in which
he or she feels forced to take a last stand in defence of a moral system and his or her claim of moral worth under it. Half of this description is tautological. Since we are talking about heat-of-passion
13 The terms "being bad" and "being hard," as well as the distinction between the
two forms of moral transcendence, are mine, not Katz's. Particular care should be taken
to distinguish these terms from the compelling project of being a "badass," which is
Katz's term for the basic devotion to the invocation of hardness. The badass, like all of
the predatory street criminals which are built on him, is dedicated, in varying degrees, to
both forms of transcendence.
A second point about this dichotomy should be noted. Being bad and being hard
are by no means distinct. Indeed, being hard is a particular substantive subset of being
bad. I distinguish them because Katz's discussion includes crimes which are dedicated
to hardness but intrinsically reject badness (heat-of-passion homicide) and crimes which
are dedicated to badness but intrinsically reject hardness (adolescent shoplifting). Only
when it comes to the predatory street crimes do we find compelling projects which embrace both forms of transcendence and blur the lines between them.
14 J.KArZ, supra note 1,at 12.
15 Id. at 18.
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homicides, there must be a significant provocation, and it is obvious
that this provocation can be characterized as a moral affront. But
there is a non-tautological, genuinely descriptive claim here as well.
Katz notes the striking correlation between passionate homicide and
the physical and temporal dimensions of leisure. Passionate homicides largely occur in informal settings; they rarely occur at work or
at formal private occasions (like weddings). Why? It is not that we
are subject to less provocation on formal occasions and at work.
Rather, these are worlds from which there is escape; but there is no
escape from the world of leisure. Hence, moral affronts in this
16
world are all the more often last stands.
It is not sufficient that the killer suffer from a moral affront from
which there is no (social) room for retreat. The provocation must
be transformed into passion; the affront must give way to rage. The
center of the process by which affront becomes rage is humiliationan emotion which is generated by the moral affront and instantaneously transformable into rage. 17 Humiliation must be distinguished
from other kinds of emotional reactions to affront or provocation.
Humiliation is not frustration. Frustration does not carry with it the
implicit social dimensions which humiliation carries. One can feel
frustrated and angry without experiencing a fundamental challenge
to one's social or moral worth. In other words, frustration is directed toward external constraints on action, and does not carry implicit recognition of diminished moral worth. Shame should also be
distinguished from humiliation. Shame requires the internal acceptance of affront, even while it carries anger toward the affronter.18
Both frustration and shame are possible reactions to the affront of
provocation which is a last stand or respectability. Only when humiliation follows is the project of passionate homicide sustained.
The sense of humiliation must be transformed into rage. How
is this possible? First, rage and humiliation are experientially continuous. Under both emotions one experiences oneself as totally in
the grip of external forces. In humiliation, the external forces are
social and moral conventions which discredit one's total being. In
humiliation the self is experienced as totally open to external social
forces. The humiliated self is transparent to the social conventions
which brand it. Rage is total surrender to righteousness. 19 As it
accompanies acts of moral transcendence, rage creates an experience of the self as a conduit of righteous action. The raging self is
16 Id. at 19-22.
17 Id. at 22-24.
18 Id. at 26-27.
19 Id. at 24-26.
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not transparent to the social or moral norms which humiliated; but
directed in action against those norms, the enraged self is totally
open to the moral norms of righteousness. Second, rage is the mirror image of humiliation. In humiliation one is totally opened up to
social forces which make one powerless. In rage the self is totally
open to forces of power. Humiliation is diffuse and unending; it has
no precise denouement. Thus, at the moment of humiliation the
sense of self threatens to remain indefinitely. Rage is precise and
seeks focus. It is directed at an exact denouement. Rage is the antidote to humiliation. All one need do to turn humiliation to rage is
"turn the structure of... humiliation on its head." 2 0
Finally, the rage must be embodied in violence. Katz has relatively little to say about this process, except to emphasize that the
violence is not random and it is not generally cathartic. There is a
particular end to this violence, a particular victim, and often a particular way of carrying out the crime. These particular forms of violence are tailored to the righteous rage which the affront
21
triggered.
The sensual, seductive pull which motivates these murders is
the possibility of moral transcendence over the social demand that
we be morally malleable beings. The practical exigencies of homicide demand violent action. In order to link one with other (to act
out these immaterial forces in the physical and temporal world), a
psychological process must manage the rise from insult experienced
to righteousness embodied. Society tells us to endure insults and
provocations. If we cannot ignore them, we must externalize them
and experience them only as blockages (frustration), or internalize
them and atone (shame). As long as we can accept the requirement
of malleability, challenges to the moral order within which we value
ourselves will be experienced, if at all, as frustrations or shameful
things. But we cannot fully accept the injunction. When we cannot
these affronts are humiliating and enraging.
Katz emphasizes that this project is not one of necessary and
distinct stages. Rather, they should be understood as strands of explanation which interweave to account for an act of passionate
homicide.2 2 One might just as easily include among the necessary
and sufficient conditions for homicide to occur a victim who is willing to keep the pressure on until a situation is definable only as a
last stand, and an assailant able to tempt fate by jumping the divide
20
21
22

Id. at 27.
Id. at 31-39.
Id. at 39.
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between humiliation and rage. 23 Katz's description of heat-of-passion homicide is, therefore, not a list of necessary-and-sufficient
conditions, nor is it a phenomenological chronology of the crime. It
is an explanation which makes the relevant data 24 into a coherent
depiction of the project of moral transcendence.
B.

BEING BAD:

ADOLESCENT SHOPLIFTING

Katz's description of petty adolescent "thrill" crimes- vandalism, breaking and entering, joy riding, and predominantly shoplifting-illustrates the seductive pull of moral transcendence in the
form of being bad. Rather than trying to establish a self hardened
to the demand of moral malleability, these adolescents embrace a
project which maximizes their malleability in order to make possible
their deviance from social conventions. These adolescents not only
act deviantly by committing criminal actions, they experience themselves in deviant ways by living out a studied self-consciousness of
conventional life. Katz summarizes his account of adolescent shoplifting this way:
The sneaky thrill is created when a person: (1) tacitly generates the
experience of being seduced to deviance; (2) reconquers her emotions
in a concentration dedicated to the production of normal appearances;
(3) and then appreciates the reverberating
significance of her accom25
plishment in a euphoric thrill.
The beginning of the crime is the awareness of the seductive
capacities of outside forces. Initially, it is the objects themselves, or
their environment, which seduce the would-be shoplifter. He or she
may enter the store with the stealing in mind, but rarely with specific
plans to steal particular items (or kinds of items). The items themselves call out to be taken. 26 But it is not just the item which seduces
the would-be thief. That would ground the crime in material desire.
In fact, Katz's sample of shoplifting narratives is drawn from a predominately upper-middle-class group of university students. Most
of them, even at the time of the pilfering, had (or could easily get)
the money to buy the seductive object. What combines with the seductive force emanating from the object is the seductive appeal of
"getting away with it." Thus, the seductive force is not one that
emanates from the object, inducing the crime. Rather, the shoplifter
23 See id. at 39-43.

24 Katz's data, which I have not discussed (since I want to focus on the coherence of
his theoretical framework), is comprised of various thick descriptions of heat-of-passion
homicides.

25 J. KArz, supra note 1, at 53.
26 Id. at 53-56.
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is already (partially) seduced by the idea of getting away with something; only within this seduction do the seductive properties of the
object work. The larger seduction, which imbues the object with its
own uniquely seductive properties, is the force which entices the
shoplifter to play with the boundaries between the publicly-pro27
jected persona of moral convention and the inner deviant persona.
The seductive force which impels the adolescent shoplifter is firstly
moral transcendence in the form of being bad; only secondarily, and
by virtue of this first seduction, do particular objects take on a seductive capacity of their own.
Thus, the crime of shoplifting, for the adolescent at least, is
constituted along two simultaneous paths. As in the account of passionate killers, the actor must manage his or her psychological condition as a way of mediating between the seductive forces and the
material world. First, the adolescent must accomplish the theft and
evade detection. Second, the adolescent must appear conventional
while his or her internal psyche is wholly deviant. Although these
projects are overlapping-the internal deviance is manifested in a
studied paranoia which is clearly necessary to evade detection-they
are fundamentally different.
The shoplifter experiences continual tension between the appearance she or he must maintain-normalcy-and what is "really" going on-a deviant project. Suddenly an ordinary world becomes extraordinarily complex. How do "normal" customers carry
themselves in a department store? The actor has to endure a real
paranoia about the world. If the adolescent is playing at appearances, how does he or she know that seemingly unconcerned store
personnel are not? The result is that the process is string of tensions and partial resolutions, culminating in "the step" out of the
front doors. The physical project, and hence the crime, cannot be
committed without undergoing this sense of acute internal deviance;
and the euphoric thrill which follows cannot be experienced without
the paranoia. 28 In comparison to this dimension of the project, the
physical problem of making the theft and evading detection is relatively straightforward. It is only by acting out the radical separation
between internal deviance and external conventionality that the adolescent shoplifter responds to the sensual forces which motivated
the project. These forces seduce the actor to play with the boundaries between inner and outer self. The secondary seduction-that of
the object itself-is satisfied only secondarily-in the project of
27
28

Id. at 56-58.
Id. at 58-64.
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physical pilfering. Once it is acquired, the object has little intrinsic
significance; outside of the seductive force of "getting away with it,"
the object is no longer empowered to seduce. But the rewards of
the act are nonetheless strong. After the last test of appearances is
successfully passed, the adolescent pilferer experiences elation.
The thrill is realized. The content of this thrill is the sense of relief
at avoiding what the deviant attitude and actions have flirted withthe humiliation at discovery. The act is accomplished both seriously
and playfully. The sense of euphoria is the thrill at having won a
game. Having won the game at hiding deviance with a conventional
veneer, the adolescent experiences a sense of social empowerment
29
and charisma.
C.

BEING BOTH BAD AND HARD:

THE "BADASS"

AS THE

PROTOTYPICAL PREDATORY CRIMINAL

In Katz's concept of "the badass" we find a criminal project
whose transcendent seductive appeal conflates what I have called
"being bad" and "being hard." The badass is transcendently bad
because he carries hardness to extremes which go far beyond socially accepted hardness; he is transcendently hard because his badness is so ornate and consistent that he loses contact with the
routine social world. In the posture of the consummate badass we
can no longer distinguish badness and hardness. In their place we
find the seductive capacities of chaos as a goal of moral transcendence. It is out of chaos that predatory street crime is constructed.
"To make vivid sense of all the detailed ways of the badass," Katz
writes, "one must consider the essential project as one of transcending the modern moral injunction to adjust the public self
sensitively to situational contingent expectations. ' 30 The transcendence comes in three stages: being tough (or hard), being alien,
and finally, being mean.
The first stage in the project of being a badass is being tough:
employing the symbols of an impenetrably deviant self. The easiest
set of symbols to use are the conventional accoutrements of the
tough: leather clothing, metal ornaments, boots, sunglasses, tatoos,
etc. Because these symbols are easy to don, they are meaningless by
themselves:
[I]n the privacy of a bedroom, one may drape the body in leather and
chains, practice a hard look in the mirror, apply apparently permanent
but really erasable tatoos of skulls and crossbones, and so forth.
29 Id. at 64-73.
30 Id. at 81.
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When one enters a store to buy cigarettes, however, it may feel impossible not to wait one's turn with the clerk politely, and even to finish
the transaction with a muttered 'thanks.' "31
Thus, one must adopt ways of being tough in social interactions. One must refuse to play along with "prophylactic rituals on
the moral health of everyday life"-hellos, goodbyes, pleases, and
thank yous-or play out these rituals in deviant ways. 3 2 Being tough
is a "process of negation" which closes one's self off from the demands of malleability which inhere in the everyday world, by means
of separation-"a visual block, a symbolic sartorial shield, an audible muffle, or a maneuver that inverts the suggestions of a morally
open self." 3 3 But it is not enough to be merely hard. The badass
must begin to be bad. He does this by being alien-occupying the
moral terrain of a subculture which shows that he comes from a
"morally alien place."' 34
Being alien means assuming the moral and practical characteristics of hardness through the ways of a bad or deviant subculture.
Katz discusses these ways in rich detail. The "ghetto bop" or the
"barrio stroll"-styles of public self-presentation- "identifies the
walker as a native of a place outside and antagonistically related to
the morally respectable center of society."' 3 5 Tatoos emphasize badness because of their generic deviance and their specially deviant
content (skulls, swastikas, etc.); and they emphasize hardness by the
relative permanence of bad allegiances they announce. 36 Alien ways
of talking distinguish badasses not only from "respectable" society,
37
but even from the ordinary citizens of their own ethnic cultures.
Katz illustrates these themes with particular subtlety in an extended
discussion of the cholo (the adolescent gangs of Southwestern barrios) and punk subcultures. 38 An important convergence point for
the styles of various alien deviant subcultures is animal symbolism,
suggesting the "animal incapacity for moral responsiveness. ' 39
The complementary projects of moral transcendence through
hardness and badness are not sufficient to make the badass. Both
projects are unstable and under constant threat from outside. Those
who would be hard are "pursued by powerful spiritual enemies"Id. at 82.
Id. at 81-87.
33 Id. at 87.
34 Id. at 88.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 89.
37 Id. at 89-90.
38 Id. at 90-97.
39 Id. at 97.
31
32
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cops, judges, politicians, teachers, rival peers-"who soften tough
postures . .. making them appear silly, puerile, banal." 40 (Street
gangs, for instance, abhor the label "gang" when applied to them.
It connotes a group of delinquent children adopting postures. They
think of themselves instead as a family or association, or even a mob
[in the organized-crime sense]. Street rivals are "gangs," however.4 1) These problems are compounded by the difficulties of the
practical project of maintaining constant toughness. "How," Katz
asks, "does one order food at a restaurant in punk style? How does
42
one answer a teacher's question like a cholo?"
Badness is threatened by aesthetic affectation-the corruption
of the styles of badness by the respectable into marginally deviant
forms. Recent Bennington graduates working in New York publishing houses sport leatherjackets. Upper middle class teenage boys in
California read "Thrasher" magazine and wear skulls. Weekend
punks on Melrose Avenue wash the cellophane colors from their
hair in time to go to work in the San Fernando Valley on Monday.
The deviant world loses its ability to transport the badass to moral
transcendence when it is made semi-respectable by those whose
commitment to it is ephemeral and, in the last analysis, respectable.
Without more, the badass's compelling project is unstable,
threatened by outside forces which want to dissolve its hardness and
badness. 43 There is thus a final stage to being the badass, adopting
a transcendent goal which goes beyond mere hardness and badness
to higher, stable synthesis of the two: "To complete the project of
becoming a badass, it is necessary to impress on others the apprehension that, however carefully they may maintain a respectable
comportment, you might suddenly thrust the forces of chaos into
44
their world."
In order to work through the practical project of injecting chaos
into the world, the badass must be supremely mean. He must not
only be violent, he must be arationally violent. Note that this is not
irrational violence; uncontrolled random violence cannot sustain a
hard commitment to a bad world. Rather, the badass's commitment
to violence is based on moral principles which do not square with
the canons of rationality that work in the respectable world. Violence is not fundamentally something instrumental to the badasssomething that he uses because it gets him things-it is a seductive
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

99.
115.
95.
99.
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end in itself. Chaotic violence is the working through in the respectable temporal world of a sensibility of an alien, totally deviant, spiritual world:
Whether through physical attack or via dramatization at a distance, the
badass conveys the specific message that he means it. If we ask, what is
"it" that he means? we miss the point. To construct and maintain an
awesome, ominous presence, the badass must not allow others to
grasp the goals or substantive meaning of his action.... The badass's
logic of domination is to mean nothing more or less than meanness:
He succeeds by inducing others to reason, to reflect on the extraneous
meaning of violence, to weigh the value of experiencing dominance
against fear of physical destruction and legal punishment, when he will
45
not make the calculation. Now and again he must go a little bit mad.
Through this embrace of meanness-"a pristinely rational social logic for manifesting that one has transcended rationality" 46the badass creates a phenomenal world finally secure from the respectable forces which threaten the more banal strategies of bad47
ness and hardness.
D.

CONCLUSION

The greater part of Seductions of Crime is devoted to a dense explanation of street gangs and armed robbery. Katz's account of
these crimes plays off of the themes I have just discussed. Moral
transcendence is at the heart of the criminal project, Hardness and
badness as the substantive ends of transcendence are unstable in
their banal forms, and so the gang member or "hardman" (stickup
artist) must finally resort to arational violence to prove that he
means it, whatever "it" means. 48 Katz's discussions of street gangs
and armed robbery- like his discussions of passion murder, adolescent shoplifting, and the ways of the badass-are rich with detail and
cogent analysis of the experiential foregrounds of these crimes. But
what does the model of the compelling project prove? I will explore
this question next.
45 Id. at 100.

Id. at 101.
See id. at 99-112.
48 1 am ignoring the penultimate chapter of the book, on premeditated (usually robbery-) homicide; it is by far the weakest portion of the book, largely (as Katz readily
acknowledges) because of the weakness of the data (he is forced to rely on popular accounts of famous instances, like Capote's IN CoL BLOOD, Mailer's THE EXECuTiONER'S
SONG, and Abbot's IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST instead of first-hand accounts or sociological fieldwork.)
46
47
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THE COMPELLING PROJECT'S CONTRIBUTION TO OUR
UNDERSTANDING

OF CRIME

Seductions of Crime looks strikingly like an extended elaboration
on Durkheim's famous maxim, that in a society of saints the least
saintly will be branded a criminal. Does it say anything more than
that?
I argued above that the idea of the compelling project, by which
the actor manages a response to a sensual compelling experience, is
not drawn from Katz's data (his local observations or empirical generalizations about crime), it is built into the very idea of asking
about the foreground causes of crime. Although it is tempting to
read Seductions of Crime as "discovering" the compelling project in its
thick descriptions of the first-person experience of criminal actors,
we must in fact see the compelling project as the theoretical or explanatory structure which Katz imposes upon these thick descriptions. This is not to say that Katz is somehow "biased" in his
analysis, or at least any more biased than other criminologists. No
explanatory paradigm is neutral and unbiased; all have their predefined categories which give shape to empirical data. Dominant
liberal criminology reads crime through a filter of social forces
which work through the actor in a transparent way. 49 Dominant
conservative criminology reads the data through a filter which emphasizes criminal conduct as a rational choice made under
constraints. 50
The second level of Katz's explanatory paradigm, one step
closer to thick description than the idea of the compelling project
per se, is the idea that compelling criminal projects are constituted
by the sensual force of moral transcendence. This is the idea which
makes Katz's structure look like a restatement of Durkheim's maxim.
Is this concept also tautologically implicit in the very question Katz
asks, or does it tell us something about the data? 5 ' In a sense it is,
since the sensual foreground attraction of a force which impels deviant action must be some variety of the notion of transcendence over
the norms of the world against which the action is defined as devi49 E.g., CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME: AN AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1985).
50 E.g.,J.Q.WILSON & R. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE (1985);J. Q. WIL-

SON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
51 Of course, everything that SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME will say is shaped by the presuppositions of the questions Katz poses. But some of the explanatory concepts will be
tautological (i.e., they flow from the question in their precise form regardless of the nature of the empirical data) while others will be views of the data through the lens of Katz's
question. The base idea of the compelling project is, as I have argued above, tautological.
It may be interesting as a theoretical matter, but it tells much more about Katz himself
than the data on the criminal conduct he is trying to explain.
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ant. But viewing transcendence as following tautologically from the
basic idea of the compelling project requires viewing the sensual appeal and the actual act as too tightly linked. Such a sensual appeal
would not be merely "transcendence" but "transcendence through
criminal action X." But if we view the configuration of the mundane
or conventional world as "setting the stage" for the practical working-out of transcendence, then it does not tautologically flow from
the compelling project. Under this view, the seductive appeal and
the practical setting of the world are individually necessary and
jointly sufficient to account for the details found in the experiential
foreground of a crime. As such, moral transcendence has an elusive
quality until it is examined working through a particular world-setting for a particular crime. Little wonder, then, that Katz describes
the seductive quality and compulsive force driving transcendental
meanness as "chaos." Thus, to begin to see Katz's explanations as
being about crime, and not just being tautological implications of
the question he asks, we have to interpret him as converging toward
the view that crime (generally, as opposed to particular crimes) is
fundamentally ineffable. To get anything of substance from Seductions of Crime, we have to take Katz out of the business of making
predictions. His ideas have predictive power only insofar as they are
tautological restatements of his initial question. And, of course, this
predictive power is wholly formal: What causes crime? Sensual attraction. When is a sensual attraction an efficient cause of crime?
When it is an attraction which offers moral transcendence. When
does a sensual attraction offer moral transcendence? When it leads
to criminal conduct. What leads to criminal conduct? This explains
the Durkheimian air of the explanation which I mentioned above. It
also explains, I think, Katz's uniformly unhelpful attempts to bridge
his foreground account to the usual background (predictive) variables. While his foreground explanations hang together extremely
well on their own terms, the denatured accounts which he uses to
make sense of the various background factors seem dogmatic and
circular. On the degree to which the compelling project challenges
traditional positivist criminolc.gy, Katz writes:
[T]he readily available, detailed meaning of common criminality has
been systematically ruled out as ineligible for serious discussion the
conventions of modem sociological and political thought.... Somehow in the psychological and sociological disciplines, the lived mysticism and magic in the foreground or criminal experience become
unseeable, while the abstractions hypothesized by "empirical theory"
as the determining background causes, especially those conveniently
quantified by state agencies, become the stuff of "scientific" thought
and "rigorous" method.... [T]he point of this volume is to demon-
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strate that it is not necessary to constitute the field back to front.... If
we take as our primary research commitment an exploration of the
distinctive phenomena of crime, we may produce not just ad hoc bits
of description or a collection of provocative anecdotes but a systematic
empirical theory of crime-one that explains at the individual level the
causal process of committing a crime and that accounts at the aggregate level for recurrently documented
correlations with biographical
52
and ecological background factors.
For the reasons just given, I doubt that Katz can do this. There
is no way to fit the foreground experience of hardness and the rewards of moral transcendence it offers to the badass, for example,
with background correlations (youth, maleness, poverty, low intelligence) of being a badass. The composite discourse is incoherent
and unsatisfactory. It would be just as unsatisfactory to say that
young, poor males are attracted to the criminal pattern of the badass
because of the moral allure which chaos presents as it would be to
say that this particular badass does what he does because he is
young, poor, and a he. In the experiential background, moral transcendence is an ineffable, chaotic quality; in the foreground, age,
poverty, and gender do not play pivotal roles in the setting through
which the seductive quality of chaos works.
Katz should recognize this problem with his aspiration that the
field of criminology be reconstituted "back-to-front,' which makes
his commitment to the claim seem all the stranger. He takes the
"materialist" account of crime-that crime is caused by perceived
material needs which cannot be satisfied in legitimate or legal
ways-to task for its failure to see that material things and needs
play a causal role in the experiential foreground only to the degree
in which they are infused with seductive qualities by the compelling
project. And, further, the materialist account serves the function of
making the world of crime seem pacific and mundane, instead of
chaotic, spiritual, and fundamentally ineffable. 53 And of the materialist account's commitment to the proposition that poverty correlates well with street crime because the perception of material need
is strongest among the poor, Katz writes:
Instead of reading into ghetto poverty an unusually strong motivation
to become deviant, we may understand the concentration of robbery
among ghetto residents as being due to the fact that for people in economically more promising circumstances, it would literally make no
sense-it would be virtually crazy-to commit robbery.... In part, the
appeal of [this] theory was promoted by the obvious significance of
material circumstances in the shaping of crime. We need fear only few
52 J. KArz, supra note 1, at 31-12.
53 Id. at 312-17.
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exceptions if we claim that lawyers will not stick up banks, "frequentflyer" executives will not kill their spouses in passionate rages, and
physicians will not punch out their colleagues or that the unemployed
will not embezzle, the indigent will not fix prices, and the politically
54
powerless will not commit perjury in congressional testimony.
Notice the asymmetry among Katz's two groups of examples.
"It makes no sense" for affluent to commit armed robbery or act like
badasses (which they generally do not), while it is impossible that the
poor and powerless will commit price-fixing or embezzlement. For
the latter it is unimaginable for the simple reason that their worlds
could never be set so as to make those crimes possible. But for the
former, what? Why is it so senseless for the affluent to work out the
seductive allure of chaos through armed robbery? To be sure, they
generally do not, and the project of finding moral transcendence is
worked out through models of deviance unique to the powerful and
rich. (In fact, Katz's second major claim for his method-and one I
think well substantiated-is that it can build an account of whitecollar and political "crime" which, unlike positivist criminology, fits
with a theory of street crime and constitutes a general theory of social deviance. 55 ) But Katz does not satisfactorily explain why they
do not. I would suggest that he cannot provide this explanation because in the experiential background in which wealth driven distinctions in criminal behavior are found, the foreground feature of
moral transcendence appears to the ineffable quality of evil which
drives crime.
III.

CONCLUSION

Katz's pretensions of uncovering and correcting the errors of
more traditional criminological schools must fall. 5 6 His account
stands next to theirs, not as a perfection (or at least as a higher dialectical movement), but as an alternative vision. Seductions of Crime
challenges business-as-usual positivist criminology as an alternative
paradigm, which stands as a critique to its very core, and not a solution to the problems of positivist criminology, worked out within the
54
55

Id. at 316.
Id. at 317-24.

56 Except in one limited sense. As his method of explaining the experiential foreground of crime expands the domain of "deviant behavior" into the forms of moral

transcendence worked out by the wealthy and powerful, the positivist program of ex-

ploring the background will be pressured to account for these forms. This is not to say,
as Katz argues, that foreground and background will be brought together into a unified
field; rather, the foreground and background accounts will laterally expand, encompassing the same domains of activity under the label "deviance," but not for the same reasons or with the same results.
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confines of the generic project of understanding crime. We might
"translate" Katz's explanations into terms the positivist paradigm of
crime, and vice versa, but we will never be put in the position of
having to choose between them. Such a choice is a conundrum. Seductions of Crime should not be read as advancing this thesis (which, I
must admit, Katz readily adopts) that traditional criminology misunderstands crime. Rather, it should be read as arguing that the terms
of traditional criminology have a politics all their own.5 7 They do
not represent a point-of-viewless understanding of criminal conduct. At the center of the idea of crime-as-a-compelling-project is
the notion that the "fruits" of crime are more spiritual than material
(or, at least, that the spiritual dimension of crime is an intractable
one in criminology). The spiritual reward of crime is transcendence: a defense of the self against respectable society's demand
that the self be transparent and complacent to it. Crime is an act of
existential self-defence. Traditional positivistic criminology explains crime in terms of predictive paradigms; its general policy prescription is rational and instrumental punishment calculated to
maximize deterrence and correct the sources of crime. From the
perspective of the compelling project, punishment is a matter of
stomping out soul. The compelling project makes sense of crimes
after they occur; it makes them sensible. Positivistic criminology
makes sense of crime (no "s") before it occurs. The study of crime,
and the study of crimes, are two different subjects.
STEVEN B. KATz
LAW CLERK TO THE HON. IRVING HILL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOMICIDE. By Martin Daly and Margo Wilson. New York: Aldine De
Gruyter, 1988. 328 pages. $42.95 hard; $18.95 paper.
This book is an account of the evolutionary psychological
model (sociobiology) as it applies to homicide. The evolutionary
psychological paradigm assumes that there is no true dichotomy of
"social" versus "biological" - that sociality is an extension of biology, and therefore has no meaning outside the biological world.
57 A politics, I should add, distinct from the conventional "left"-"right" politics of
criminology; this new politics unites both left and right "materialist" views against
Katz's "spiritual" view.
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The motivational mechanisms of all creatures, including man, have
evolved to produce "nepotism": the inclination to devote one's resources to the creation and promotion of fitness of genetic relatives.
The human psyche, therefore, as one component of the human
anatomy, has been shaped by the history of selection to perpetuate
and protect its own genes. This is the logical outcome of a process
whereby those individuals equipped with nepotism have succeeded
in over-representing their genes throughout succussive generations.
The evolutionary psychological model suggests that two individuals will perceive themselves to be in conflict and will compete
violently when the promotion of one's expected fitness (genetic constitution) entails the diminuition of the other's. The model hypothesizes a negative correlation between degree of genetic overlap and
probability of intentional homicide. Using several sources of homicide data, mainly Detroit and Canadian, Daly and Wilson support
this primary (p. 23) plus numerous secondary hypotheses. Among
others, the following questions are addressed and supported within
the framework of evolutionary psychology: (1) Why do people
commit infanticide? (p. 58); (2) Why is the risk of maternal infanticide a declining function of maternal age? (p. 62, 64); (3) Why are
single women generally more likely to kill their infants than are married women of same age? (p. 63); (4) Why is a defective child more
likely to be abused, neglected or killed by his parents than a "normal" child? (p. 73); (5) Why are mothers more likely to kill a
younger than an older child? (p. 73); (6) Why is familicide (killing
spouse and children) a peculiarly male crime? (p. 82-83); (7) Why
in parent-offspring homicides is there no correlation between sex of
offender and sex of victim when prepubescent children are involved,
but there is a same-sex bias after the child reaches maturity? (p. 95,
120-1); (8) Why are human males more aggressive, violent and
homicidal than human females? (p. 163, 145-5); (9) Why are people who kill dose relatives (compared with other killers) disproportionately "insane"? (p. 265-6); (10) Why is the penalty for a sonon-aging-father homicide more severe than the penalty for an agingfather-on-son homicide? (p. 271-2).
Homicide is a brilliantly conceptualized, effectively organized and
impeccably written piece of work. It is without doubt that Daly and
Wilson have eloquently accomplished their stated objective of exploring the utility of evolutionary psychology for the study of homicide (p. 293). Their arguments are consistently thorough, and
provide critical reviews of supportive research. The main criticism
offered here is that the book may contain extraneous material. The
last three chapters appear to be only distantly related to the goals
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and focus of the project. They cover topics of blood revenge,
blameworthiness in homicide, and the importance of culture in explaining variation in homicide. Though the information in these
chapters is well-presented, it seems misplaced, and therefore detracts from the integrative quality of the overall work. Only one error was detected in this review-a small technical one at that. In a
discussion of Canada's tendency to exaggerate the gravity of the
state's response to crime, the authors point out that: "In Canada,
release on 'mandatory supervision' is routinely available after twothirds of the sentence is served" (p. 249). Then they go on to state:
"In effect, therefore, actual sentences are nominally inflated by 50%
(emphasis main)." The data supplied here indicate that sentences
are nominally inflated by a third, not 50%.
This book is highly recommended as reading for upper-level
undergraduate and graduate courses in criminology, deviance and
family violence. When combined with psychological and sociological perspectives, it provides an effective balance in theory coverage.
ANN GOETrING
WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY

THE TENOR OF JUSTICE:

CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY PLEA

PROCESS. By Peter F. Nardulli,James Eisenstein, and Roy B. Flem-

ming. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988.
Pp 469. $39.95.
The Tenor ofJustice is an analysis of the nature and extent of disparity in the guilty plea system. Measures of charge reduction and
sentence severity are the principal dependent variables. Explanatory factors range from individual and case-related characteristics to
the organizational features of the court to the environmental influences of the county and state. Nardulli and his colleagues argue
that only a cross-jurisdictional perspective, one which incorporates
both micro-level and contextual factors, will provide the scope and
richness of information necessary to explain plea outcomes.
Such an approach poses a formidable challenge of research design and implementation. Using a variety of methodologies, the authors assembled a data base of exceptional breadth and detail. Nine
medium-sized trial courts were chosen as study sites, three each
from Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. The selection criteria
sought to maximize the social, political, economic, and geographic
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variation within each state, and to duplicate this variation as much as
possible across states, resulting in three matched sets of triplets.
From each site extensive data were culled from case files, approximately 7,500 cases in the total sample. The authors supplemented
this information with hundreds of interviews, questionnaires, Qsorts, and secondary sources. The aim was to capture sufficient variation at the individual and case level of analysis to permit estimation
of effects through multivariate analysis. With only nine sites, the
contextual analysis was chiefly limited to county-by-county
comparisons.
Much of this book is given to detailed descriptions of the nine
courts and the milieu in which they operate. Particularly useful are
the sections on charging practices and prosecutorial screening, centralization of plea offers, judge shopping, and the frequency of sentence (as opposed to charge) bargaining. The authors contend that
the substance of plea negotiations is largely conditioned by these
elements. For instance, prosecutors might be more willing to yield
charge reductions in jurisdictions where the initial charges are inflated or in courts where the judges will ratify sentence agreements.
Conversely, charge reductions should be less a concern where judge
shopping is commonplace or in jurisdictions where cases are
screened early on.
The statistical analysis reveals that charge reductions have only
marginal implications for sentencing. Most defendants plead to the
primary charge upon which they were arrested; when reductions in
the primary charge do occur, they often appear to be adjustments
due to initial overcharging. Secondary counts are frequently
dropped, but little is given away since they seldom affect the sentence imposed. The main finding is that defendants receive reasonably consistent sentences based on the primary charge and the
defendant's prior criminal record. A source of bias which does
emerge from the analysis is the tougher sentences given to pretrial
detentioners. Nardulli et al. speculate that at least part of this effect
is attributable to the "defendant's weakened bargaining position
and the participants' biased perceptions of the threat posed by
lower-class defendants" (P. 243).
In terms of the ongoing debate between the "concessions"
model of plea bargaining (wide open bargaining resulting in disparate treatment of similar cases) versus the "consensus" (norm
driven) model, the authors conclude that a mixture of both is present, but that the consensus model predominates. Within each court
there is a near rigid adherence to informal norms and procedures
designed to pigeonhole defendants into a few rough groupings. An
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exception is noted where the charges involve serious crimes. These
cases provide the courtroom participants with a broader range of
possible sentences within which to maneuver. Negotiations here
tend to be more substantive than symbolic with the result that the
sentences are far less predictable. But serious crimes form only a
minor fraction of the docket in most courts. For the majority of
cases, the "going rates" sharply limit discretionary action such that
the defendants within each county are sentenced in a fairly uniform
manner.
Certain analyses in The Tenor ofJustice furnish grounds for arguing methodological preferences, although serious weaknesses are
few. One critical measurement problem, however, concerns a key
indicator of sentence severity (JAILMIN), "the minimum amount of
time a convicted defendant was required to be incarcerated, coded
in months (nonconfinement sentences coded zero)" (P. 280). This
scale arbitrarily collapses sentences of different types (diversion,
probation, incarceration) and sentences of different degree (how
long a prison term) into a single measure of sentence severity. The
approach is justified only when the same factors and the same
weights on those factors affect both the choice of sentence type and
the magnitude of the sentence. Clearly, this is an unlikely prospect,
and in any event, one to be tested rather than built into the analysis
ex ante. For these reasons, the findings associated with the sentence
severity scale are difficult to interpret. The parameter estimates may
not be relevant to any of the individual sentence types and the estimates are expressed in the metric of the artificial scale, not in
months of prison time.
The Tenor ofJustice does not include a systematic analysis of why
so many defendants self-convict rather than go to trial. The focus of
the study is elsewhere-on the consistency of treatment received by
those who enter pleas. However, the authors do report some evidence of harsher treatment for defendants exercising their right to a
jury trial. Indeed, Nardulli and colleagues believe that the magnitude of the sentencing differential suggests the presence of coercion
in some cases. Is the coercion sufficient to produce false positives,
innocent defendants who confess to avoid the greater risk of trial
and the associated transaction costs? Or is part of the sentencing
differential an artifact of sample selection and poorly measured control variables (more culpable defendants prefer to hazard a trial)?
Neither issue is investigated and both merit close attention.
Studies of the guilty plea system have been characterized by a
steady increase in the number of variables expected to have an impact on sentencing and by growing sophistication of the statistical
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models. In this domain of inquiry, The Tenor ofJustice is the most
elaborate and in many respects the most rigorous analysis to date.
Methodologically inventive, thoroughly documented, well written,
one cannot help admiring the effort that went into this book.
DONALD

J. HARRIS, PH.D.
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